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Abstract
Governments in several countries have recently spent considerable effort to
defend domestic firms against acquisition attempts from abroad and instead
favoured mergers among national firms.In this paper we offer an explanation
why globalization can reinforce the case for promoting “national champions”.
We analyze an oligopolistic market where a domestic and a foreign firm are
engaged in a takeover battle for a domestic competitor.Any merger or acqui-
sition (M&A) must be approved by the national government whose objective
function may include a bias against the foreign takeover. That bias endoge-
nously results from lobbying efforts of the domestic firm that would become
the outsider in the foreign acquisition scenario.In the case where the govern-
ment is unbiased and only cares about welfare we find that falling trade barri-
ers trigger the cross-border acquisition.However,when the domestic govern-
ment cares sufficiently strongly about lobbying contributions, globalization
has a qualitatively different effect. The foreign takeover would then only
emergeinanintermediaterangeoftradecosts.Oncetradeintegrationreaches
a critical level the biased government starts to block the foreign takeover and
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1) Introduction 
Cross-border M&A have become vastly more important over the last decades, during an on-
going process of falling trade barriers and globalization.
1 Yet, despite this general develop-
ment, there have also been a number of recent merger cases that reveal a somewhat opposite 
trend: The increased effort by governments to defend domestic firms against acquisition at-
tempts from abroad. For example, the French government has heavily opposed the announced 
takeover of the national electricity and gas company SUEZ by the Italian competitor ENEL. 
Instead it favoured a merger of SUEZ with GAZ DE FRANCE (GdF), in order to create one of 
the largest gas providers worldwide with headquarters based in France.
2 This policy approach 
of creating so-called national champions is clearly confined to specific circumstances where 
foreign corporations train their sight on prominent and large domestic target firms which are 
often active in sensible sectors of the economy. Still, the cases where governments have inter-
vened in multinational takeover battles and pushed domestic mergers have attracted huge pub-
lic and business attention, which suggests that the national champion debate is one of the key 
issues in current industrial and competition policy. In this paper we offer an explanation why 
falling trade costs (globalization) may on the one hand reinforce cross-border mergers, while 
on the other hand they can also strengthen the case for promoting national champions.  
We set up an oligopoly model where two domestic and one foreign firm compete in the do-
mestic country. The foreign firm may produce at lower unit costs than the national competi-
tors, but it faces trade costs for servicing the market. Starting from this initial situation 
changes in the ownership structure through M&A are envisaged. In particular, the foreign 
firm wants to take over one of the domestic firms in order to improve its market access. Al-
ternatively, the two domestic firms may merge to become a national champion, which cap-
tures market shares from the foreign rival. These two alternatives represent the relevant possi-
bilities in many real world cases: E.g., should SUEZ merge with GdF, or should it be taken 
over by ENEL? The takeover battle is modelled as an auction between the foreign and one 
domestic bidder for the (pre-determined) domestic target, similar as in Norbäck and Persson 
(2004) or in Inderst and Wey (2004). Yet, in this paper we assume that any change in the 
ownership structure of that industry must also be approved by the domestic government.  
                                                 
1 Cross-border M&A are the dominant form of foreign direct investment, far more important than greenfield 
investments. During the 1980s they accounted for roughly 77 per cent of all FDI flows among developed coun-
tries, whereas this share grew to almost 90 per cent in the period 1998-200. International mergers also account 
for a substantial and growing share among all M&A activities (Chapman, 2008). For an overview of recent 
trends in cross-border M&A and the relation with falling trade costs, see Hijzen et al. (2008).   
2 Other recent cases that follow a roughly similar pattern include EON/Endesa/GasNatural Arcelor/Mittal, Auto-
strade/Albertis, Danone/Pepsi, and others. See Sorgard (2007) for a policy-oriented discussion of the national 
champion debate.   5
In the decision process of whether to support or reject the firms’ merger proposal the govern-
ment may be subject to a bias against the foreign takeover. There is ample evidence for na-
tionalistic biases in industrial policy (see e.g., Brülhart and Trionfetti, 2001), and more spe-
cifically for reservations against acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign corporations. Gov-
ernments tend to favour domestic ownerships, because the management is then more likely to 
commit to production in the home country, since politicians find it easier to interact with (and 
eventually to tax) domestic owners, and so on. A foreign acquisition, in contrast, raises con-
cerns that relationships with local inputs suppliers may not be maintained or that domestic 
workers are laid off. Apart from these “real” concerns, the aversion against foreign acquisi-
tions may also be due to lobbying effort of well organized domestic interest groups which 
would be harmed by the takeover and which have good access to the relevant politicians.  
In our model we consider a nationalistic bias that endogenously results from a political econ-
omy mechanism, similar as in Motta and Ruta (2007). The owners of the domestic firm 1 that 
would become the outsider in the MNE scenario have an incentive to lobby for a blockade of 
the foreign acquisition. The subtle reason is that an effective exclusion of the foreign bidder 
(firm 3) from the takeover auction will leave firm 1 as the only potential buyer. It can then 
buy the target (firm 2) at a much lower price than without the government blockade, in which 
case the acquisition price would be determined in an open bidding process between firms 1 
and 3 where the target firm 2 reaps most of the takeover gains. We assume below that only 
this firm 1 has access to the government. Neither the foreign corporation, nor consumers, nor 
the target firm can engage in lobbying.
3 The strength of the bias against the foreign takeover 
then depends on how much the government cares about national welfare, relative to lobbying 
payments (bribes) to be received from the domestic firm 1. A little surprising implication of 
our model is that the foreign takeover is less likely to emerge in equilibrium the more gov-
ernment cares about bribes, i.e., the stronger it is biased. Our main focus, however, is to ana-
lyze how the level of trade costs affects the equilibrium ownership structure.  
Our central result is that a process of decreasing trade costs can have a qualitatively different 
impact depending on the strength of the bias. When the government cares only (or almost 
only) about welfare we find that globalization triggers the cross-border merger. The foreign 
takeover would not arise at high levels of trade costs, yet for reasons that are completely unre-
lated to political economy. Although the takeover is more valuable for the foreign firm if 
                                                 
3 The foreign firm may have too little informal contacts with, and too little information about domestic govern-
ment officials. The group of consumers is too diffuse to build an effective lobby group due to the usual collective 
action problems. Finally, the reason why the owners of the target firm cannot engage in lobbying may be due to 
their bad reputation in the general public, as they are about to receive large capital gains by selling a national 
asset abroad. Interacting with these owners does not seem opportunistic to politicians who want to get re-elected.    6
trade costs are high (since a higher chunk of these costs could be avoided), it is also more 
harmful for the domestic bidder, which would lose substantial market shares. This anti-
competitive effect dominates and allows firm 1 to win the takeover battle at high trade costs 
(similarly as in Norbäck and Persson 2004, 2005), unless the efficiency advantage of the for-
eign firm 3 is too strong. When trade integration has gone far enough, however, the foreign 
firm eventually wins the auction. An unbiased government would not block the takeover at-
tempt, since all negative impacts on national welfare (in particular the loss of domestic operat-
ing profits) will be more than compensated by the takeover price that firm 3 pays. Hence, in 
circumstances where lobbying plays no or little role our model is consistent with the overall 
empirical trend that cross-border M&A have become more important during trade integration. 
Yet, when considering a biased government that cares sufficiently strongly about bribes, we 
show that globalization reinforces the case for promoting the national champion. The eco-
nomic rent that a blockade of the foreign takeover generates for the domestic firm 1, and thus 
the willingness to pay for this blockade, is more substantial at high trade costs. The associated 
welfare gains of the takeover, which are set into perspective, are instead highest in an inter-
mediate range of trade costs. Hence, the foreign acquisition is allowed precisely in this inter-
mediate range where welfare gains are important enough relative to the luring bribes. Once 
trade costs have fallen below a critical level, however, government starts to block the takeover 
and thereby opens the door for the national champion.  
In sum, our paper has two major implications for the national champion debate. Firstly, if the 
government mainly cares about welfare it would not promote national champions. National 
mergers only arise with such governments when foreign acquisition attempts are fended with-
out the help of politicians. Hence, secondly, national champions are likely to be promoted for 
political economy reasons, and at a certain stage of trade openness further integration will 
reinforce this policy option. This result is consistent with the empirical observation that, de-
spite the general trend of an increasing importance of cross-border M&A, at least some gov-
ernments have recently increased their effort to deter foreign acquisition attempts.  
1.1. Related literature 
Our paper adds to the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI). The high policy relevance 
of the debate on national vs. cross-border mergers is not well reflected in that literature, which 
has strongly focused on greenfield FDI but devoted relatively little attention to M&A. There 
are, however, a few notable exceptions. Horn and Persson (2001) use a cooperative bargain-
ing game of merger formation in a two-country model with four symmetrical firms. They find 
that trade integration makes cross-border mergers more likely as compared to the formation of   7
national mergers. A similar result arises in Norbäck and Persson (2004) where a former state-
owned asset is auctioned off between a domestic and a foreign firm. The foreigner can decide 
to enter the market either by acquiring that asset or by a greenfield investment. If greenfield 
entry costs are high and M&A is the preferred entry mode, both the foreign and the domestic 
firm bid more the higher trade costs are. The anti-competitive (“preemptive”) motive of the 
domestic bidder dominates at high trade costs, leading to the national acquisition. Norbäck 
and Persson (2005) extend this analysis and compare a protectionist policy (allowing only the 
domestic acquisition) and a national treatment policy that also allows the foreign acquisition. 
They find that a welfare-maximizing government would not be protectionist, since the acqui-
sition price that the foreigner pays is sufficient to compensate the negative externality for the 
domestic firm while generating additional positive effects for consumers.  
Our model makes similar predictions in the case where the government is unbiased. This 
leaves open the question, however, why the national champion debate has become so promi-
nent recently while trade costs are on a further declining trend. The main contribution of this 
paper is to analyze the effect of declining trade costs on the pattern of national vs. cross-
border mergers in a model with an endogenous government bias that results from political 
economy mechanisms.
4 Furthermore, in contrast to Norbäck and Persson (2004, 2005) we do 
not consider a privatization scenario where the sole motive for the domestic bidder is to pre-
vent foreign market entry. In our setting the target firm is a competitor of the bidders and the 
domestic merger is endogenously efficient due to synergy effects. This will generate some 
subtle differences in the outcome of the takeover battle as discussed below.
5 
The impact of lobbying activities on merger policy has recently been studied by Motta and 
Ruta (2007). They consider a setup with three firms (potentially located in different countries) 
where two firms are about to merge. Both insiders and outsider engage in lobbying activities 
and try to push or, respectively, to prevent the merger, provided that competition policy can 
be influenced by elected politicians and is not carried out by an independent authority. We 
extend their analysis is two main directions. Firstly, we embed political economy in an ex-
plicit takeover auction. The biased government, which is subject to lobbying influences, can 
crucially affect the strategic position of the bidders as well as the final takeover price. Sec-
                                                 
4 Norbäck and Persson (2005) also analyze the effects of “local equity requirements (LERs)”, where the govern-
ment maintains a certain percentage of the state-owned asset after privatization. This makes the acquisition less 
attractive for the foreigner since it acts like a profit tax. The motive for this LER policy in relation to government 
preferences is not endogenously derived in Norbäck and Persson (2005), however. 
5 Further recent contributions to the literature on cross-border mergers, yet with a somewhat different focus, 
include Bjorvatn (2004), Haufler and Nielsen (2008), Lommerud et al. (2006), Neary (2007), Nocke and Yeaple 
(2007), Norbäck and Perrson (2008, 2007) and Suedekum (2008). More specifically, Huck and Konrad (2004), 
Horn and Levinsohn (2001) and Head and Ries (1997) focus on the interrelations of merger policy with other 
policy instruments. A classical reference on mergers in open economies is Barros and Cabral (1994).   8
ondly, trade costs are assumed away in Motta and Ruta (2007) whereas they play a key role in 
our model as we are particularly interested in the effect of trade integration.  
 
2) The model 
We consider a setup with three firms that produce a homogeneous good. Entry is restricted. 
Each firm possesses an intangible and non-reproducible asset like managerial skill which is 
needed to produce at all in that industry. Firms 1 and 2 and their shareholders are located in 
the domestic country “H”. Firm 3 and its shareholders are located in some outside country. 
Competition takes place on the market in H only, which is populated by a huge mass of con-
sumers. For the domestic firms 1 and 2 unit costs of production are constant and normalized 
to one. The foreign firm 3 has unit production costs  01 c  . That firm also faces iceberg 
trade costs for servicing the market: from every unit shipped to country H only a fraction 
01 g   arrives, where g represents the level of trade openness capturing all sorts of im-
pediments. Effective marginal costs for the foreign firm are, thus,  0 cg . Starting from this 
initial situation, where all three firms act independently, we consider the following four-stage 
game that will be solved by backward induction for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium:  
First stage: The would-be domestic outsider (firm 1) can make contribution payments and the   
   strength of the government’s nationalistic bias is determined 
Second stage: The shareholders of the firms 1 and 3 bid for the domestic target firm 2 in a   
   takeover auction. The winner submits a merger proposal to the government 
Third stage: The domestic government approves or rejects the merger proposal 
Fourth stage: Firms compete non-cooperatively à la Cournot in the product market
6  
Firm 2 is the pre-designated acquisition target. In other words, it is “in the air” that the foreign 
corporation 3 (call it ENEL) is only interested in taking over firm 2 (SUEZ), but it is not at all 
interested in buying firm 1 (GdF), for reasons such as an incompatibility of corporate cul-
tures. We further focus our attention on two possible ownership structures that can emerge:  
1.)   The formation of a national champion through a merger of the domestic firms 1 and 2 
2.)  A takeover of firm 2 by the foreign firm 3 
We do not consider the case that one of the domestic firms tries to buy the foreign competitor, 
and we rule out by assumption that all three firms merge to a monopoly on the domestic mar-
ket, since this would never be tolerated by the national government. Also we will assume that 
                                                 
6 All essential results of this paper remain robust under Bertrand competition where firms produce heterogeneous 
goods, although the notation becomes much more complex. Results on this issue are available upon request.   9
both types of M&A give rise to sufficiently strong “synergy effects”, i.e., reductions in post-
merger production costs, so that some merger will clearly arise in equilibrium. This assump-
tion, which is clarified formally below, also seems quite realistic: Once a takeover battle is 
launched, it is often no longer conceivable that no merger takes place and firms just stay inde-
pendent.
7 In the remainder of this section we derive the market outcomes in the fourth stage of 
the game for the three possible ownership structures that exist in this model. 
2.1.  Initial situation without M&A 
To obtain closed form solutions we assume that demand in country H is linear and given by  
  p ab H    2, 0 ab   (1) 
p denotes the price, and  12 3 Hxxg x   is the total quantity of the commodity that is con-
sumed. This consists of the domestic production by firms 1 and 2 ( 12 , x x ), and the production 
of the foreign firm net of transport losses ( 3 gx  ). The three firms solve the following profit 
maximization problems by choosing, respectively, their quantities  1 x ,  2 x  and 3 x  
  	 	 3 ii j i i Max a b x x g x x x 
        12 ,, ; ij i j   (2) 
  	 	 31 2 3 3 3 M a x a bx x gx gx cx 
        (3) 
This is a standard asymmetrical Cournot game that yields the following Nash equilibrium 
quantities ( i x ), price ( p ) and profits ( i 
 ) that are superscripted with “pre” to highlight that 
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We impose parameter restrictions to ensure that the foreign firm is active on the domestic 
market in the initial situation ( 3 0
pre x  ). This requires that the effective marginal costs of the 
foreign firm cg  are sufficiently low, or in turn that trade costs are sufficiently low: 
32 trade gg c a  () . For the welfare evaluation we use the standard concept of total na-
tional surplus, which equals the sum of consumer surplus,  	  	 	 2
pre pre pre CS H a p   , and 
the profits of the two national firms:  	 12
pre pre pre pre CS 

 
   . 
                                                 
7 The assumption of general synergy effects in production is needed to deal with the well known “merger para-
dox” that arises in models of Cournot competition. As shown by Salant et al. (1983) mergers are typically not 
profitable for the participants in the absence of synergies. If synergy effects are sufficiently strong mergers be-
come profitable to insiders and hurt the respective outsider (see, e.g., Motta 2004).    10
2.2. National  champion 
If the national champion is formed we have an asymmetric Cournot duopoly in the fourth 
stage. We denote the single national firm by   12  . Profit maximization problems are now 
     	  	   3 12 12 12 12 Max a b x g x x s x 
           (5) 
      	  	 33 3 3 12 M a x a bx gx gx cx 
         (6) 
Post-merger unit costs of the national champion are equal to s, where 01 s  represents the 
general synergy effects of the merger. The following endogenous variables can be computed 
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Profits   12
nat 
   are divided among the domestic shareholders. The division rule will play an 
important role in the takeover battle below, but for the welfare evaluation of this ownership 














     (8) 
Comparing (7) and (4) we can establish some useful preliminary results. The proof and the 
definition of the threshold levels can be found in appendix A. 
Lemma 1: Effects of the national champion 
(a)   12 12
nat pre pre 

 
   requires ss 
   ,     (b) 
nat pre CS CS   requires  CS ss   , where  CS ss 
   . 
The national champion is profitable for the participating firms 1 and 2 if the synergy effect is 
sufficiently strong (ss 
   ), reminiscent of the well known “merger paradox” (Salant et al., 
1983). Yet, consumers benefit from it only with a stronger efficiency gain,  CS ss s 
   , so 
that prices fall despite the increase in market concentration.
8 It is also instructive to consider 
the effect of the national merger on the foreign outsider firm. Traditional merger analysis has 
found that outsiders tend to benefit from mergers under standard Cournot conditions (Farrel 
                                                 
8 The thresholds for s are lower the lower the production cost advantage of the foreign competitor is, the better 
the market H is sheltered through trade costs, and the larger market size a is. The intuition is that the domestic 
firms have a stronger position on the market H the higher c is and the lower g is. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) 
show that horizontal mergers among strong firms are less likely to be profitable than among weak firms.    11
and Shapiro, 1990). Yet, using (7) and (4), we can compute the following merger externality 
for the foreign firm: 




16 2 9 3 2
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         (9) 
By decomposing (9) it can be shown that the overall sign of this externality depends on the 
term  	 46 ac g s   , which is unambiguously negative when  CS ss   . That is, if the syn-
ergy effect is strong enough to imply lower consumer prices (a condition that is assumed to 
hold below), a negative externality for the foreign outsider firm follows.  
 
2.3. Foreign  takeover 
The alternative scenario is that firm 3 takes over firm 2 whereas firm 1 stays as an independ-
ent competitor. Operating profits of the newly created MNE accrue to the foreign headquarter 
location and are “lost” for country H. However, a takeover price   is paid from abroad which 
is received as a capital gain by the domestic shareholders of the target firm 2.  
In the fourth stage of the game this scenario gives rise to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly 
between the MNE and the domestic outsider firm 1. Trade costs play no role any longer, be-
cause the MNE can draw on the existing distribution network and facilities of firm 2. In addi-
tion, we assume that the takeover gives rise to synergy effects of identical absolute strength in 
production. That is, post-merger unit costs of the MNE are equal to  	 011 cs  , which 
implies a parameter restriction  1 cs .
9 The profit maximization problems are now given by 
  	 	 11 1 1 MNE Max a b x x x x 
      (10) 
  	 	 	 	 1 1 MNE MNE MNE MNE Max a b x x x c s x 
      , (11) 











































With (12), (7) and (4) we can establish three useful results regarding the foreign takeover in 
comparison with the pre-merger scenario. These results are proven in appendix B. 
                                                 
9 Note that this implies stronger cost synergies of the international takeover in relative terms if the foreign firm 
has an initial cost advantage ( 1 c  ). The trade cost savings then come in addition to these general synergies. 
Recently, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) and Qui and Zhou (2006) have argued that cross-border M&A are in fact 
likely to yield stronger total synergies than national mergers.    12
Lemma 2: Effects of the international takeover 
If  CS ss    it follows that:     (a)  23 MNE
int pre pre 
 
 
   ,       (b) 
int pre p p  ,         (c)  11
int pre 

    
The lemma states that if the synergy effect is strong enough to render the national champion 
profitable and efficient from the consumer perspective (if  CS ss   ), then the international take-
over must also be profitable in the sense that gross profits of the MNE (excluding the takeover 
price) exceed the pre-merger profits of the participating firms 2 and 3. Under the same pa-
rameter restriction the takeover also implies lower prices for the domestic consumers. The 
reason is that trade cost savings arise as an additional effect on top of the general synergies.
10 
Finally, the lemma implies that the international takeover induces a negative externality on 
the (now domestic) outsider firm when the parameter restriction  CS ss    holds. 
We assume from now on that the general synergy effect is, in fact, strong enough to ensure 
that both merger types Pareto-dominate the pre-merger constellation. More specifically, we do 
not only require that  CS ss    holds, but for notational convenience we assume that an even 
stronger general synergy effect  	 CS trade ss gg    exists:
11 










ss gg a 

        (hence, 24 a 
!
)    
This assumption implies, economically, that some merger will surely arise in equilibrium 
 
3) The government approval decision 
In this section we analyze the government’s decision on the merger proposal in the third stage 
of the game, where the strength of the bias against the foreign takeover is already determined. 
I.e., we deal at first with the consequences not with causes of the government bias.  
Welfare in the foreign takeover scenario consists of the domestic consumer surplus (
int CS ), 
the profit level of the domestic outsider firm ( 1
int 
 ), and the takeover price for the target firm 
( ) that would be sold abroad:  1
int int int CS 
 
   . The government then simply deducts 
some  0   from this proper (unbiased) level of welfare. The term  measures the strength 
of the nationalistic bias against the foreign takeover, which will be endogenously determined 
                                                 
10  CS s s    is only a sufficient but not a necessary condition. Gross profits of the MNE may increase compared to 
the pre-merger scenario even without any direct synergy effects (i.e. even with 1 s  ), purely as a result of trade 
cost savings. Additional synergy effects reinforce this effect. 
11 Note that  CS s   is decreasing in g, hence setting  CS trade ss g  ()   requires a stronger synergy effect than the 
weaker parameter restriction  CS s s   . All results in the remainder of this paper would hold under that weaker 
restriction, but the notation would become considerably more complicated.   13
in the first stage of the game that is discussed below.
12 Using (12) and assumption 1, govern-
ment evaluates the foreign takeover scenario as follows: 










        (13) 
The role of the government at this stage is to approve or to reject the merger proposal that is 
submitted by the winner of the takeover auction. If the foreign firm places no sufficient bid 
and the domestic firm 1 wins the auction, the request for the national merger would always 
pass since assumption 1 implies 
nat pre 
 
. If firm 3 wins the auction and requests the take-
over at price , government compares 
int   from eq. (13) with the welfare level that arises 
under the alternative national merger scenario, 
nat 
 . If  0
int nat  
 , the foreign takeover is 
approved and implemented. If  0
int nat  
 the government rejects the foreign takeover and 
the national merger is implemented. Using (8), (13) and assumption 1 this decision depends 
on the differences in consumer surplus ( CS  ) and domestic operating profits ( ), and it 
includes the takeover price   and the level of bias : 
  	 	
22 1
734 73 4 0
162
int nat CS CS CS a c a c g
b
          (14) 




235 53 8 0
81




               (15)   
  
int nat CS B   
       (16) 
The foreign takeover is always superior from the point of view of domestic consumers due to 
the saving of trade costs (see eq. (14)). The difference in domestic operating profits (eq. (15)) 
is clearly negative, because profits of the acquired target now accrue to the foreign country 
and the domestic outsider firm suffers a profit loss. Furthermore, one can prove that 
0 CS      holds (see appendix C): the consumer gain alone is not sufficient to compen-
sate the loss of operating profits that arises in country H with the foreign takeover. Hence, 
even if the government were completely unbiased a strictly positive takeover price is needed 
to compensate for this profit loss, i.e., 
int nat  
 requires some  0    even if  0  .  
More generally, since the strength of the bias is already determined at this stage, we can use 
(16) to explicitly calculate the minimum takeover price for any given level of  that the for-
eign firm 3 has to pay in order to get government approval:  
                                                 
12 One possibility to simplify this model is to consider an exogenously determined bias B without specifying its 
endogenous origin in a political economy framework.    14
int nat
min   
   	 CS B      (17) 
   	 	 	  	
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This minimum price  min   depends positively on the strength of the bias: The larger  is, the 
higher is the price that firm 3 needs to pay in order to convince the patriotic government. A 
constraint of the type min    is not relevant for firm 1. The government involvement affects 
the domestic firm indirectly, however, because the bias may effectively exclude firm 3 from 
the takeover auction when it is not willing to pay as much as  min  .  
  
4. Takeover auction and determination of the takeover price 
In the second stage of the game, firms 1 and 3 bid for the pre-designated target firm 2. Our 
setup is similar to the takeover auction among symmetrical firms that Inderst and Wey (2004) 
have modelled in a closed economy, but we place it in an open economy context where bid-
ders are asymmetric in terms of unit costs, market access and exposure to government control. 
Firm 2 is assumed to set some initial reservation price r . The two potential buyers then en-
gage in a simultaneous bidding process, subject to the constraint that firm 3 effectively par-
ticipates in the auction only if it is willing to place a bid that exceeds  min  .
13  
 
4.1. Government constraint binding 
We start with the case where the government constraint is binding. Let  3    denote the maxi-
mum price that firm 3 is willing to pay for the target. This maximum price can be derived by 
comparing net profits of the foreign takeover ( MNE
int 
 ) with the profit level that firm 3 would 
earn otherwise under the national champion scenario ( 3
nat 
 ). Using (12) and (7),  3    is the 
price   that solves  3 0 MNE
int nat 

  . It is given by 
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  (18) 
The government constraint is binding if  3m i n    . The consequence of a binding government 
constraint is that the foreign firm is de facto excluded from the takeover auction and only the 
domestic firm 1 is left as a potential buyer for the target firm. In this constellation the target 
firm 2 cannot credibly commit to a take-it-or-leave-it reservation price r  that leaves firm 1 
                                                 
13 Note that our assumption 1 together with lemmas 1 and 2 ensure that (i) the insiders of the merger strictly 
gain, (ii) the respective outsider strictly loses, and (iii) industry profits strictly increase since the initial pre-
merger constellation is inefficient. These properties guarantee that some takeover will clearly occur (see Inderst 
and Wey 2004, proposition 1.2).    15
indifferent between acquiring the target in order to build up the national merger or remaining 
independent. The two domestic firms would rather engage in some negotiation about the ac-
tual division rule of the national champion’s profit. Without specifying the details of this bar-
gaining process further, we make the following assumption:
  
 
Assumption 2:    When the constraint  3m i n     is binding, the two domestic firms will   
merge and exactly split the profit level   12
nat 
  , i.e.,   1212 2
nat nat nat 


   .  
 
Our result do not crucially hinge on this specific 50-50 division rule. It is only required that 
the target firm will not reap all takeover gains in this scenario, but that that the exclusion of 
the foreign bidder leaves some takeover rents for the domestic firm 1.
14 
4.2. Government constraint not binding 
If the government constraint is not binding, if  3m i n     holds, there is a competitive bidding 
process between firms 1 and 3.  The domestic firm’s maximum bid (denoted  1   ) follows im-
plicitly from the division rule of the profit level   12
nat 
  , given that the relevant threat for firm 1 
is now the outsider position in the foreign takeover scenario ( 1
int 
 ). The maximum claim on 
the national champion’s profits that firm 1 is willing to allow for the shareholders of firm 2 is 
given by   21 12
nat nat int 

 
   , so that the residual claim   12 1 12




     just leaves 
the owners of firm 1 indifferent between the national and the international merger scenario. 
The maximum bid  1    that follows from (12) and (7) is, thus: 
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nat int c
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 
              
    (19) 
The maximum bid of the foreign firm (which faces the threat of the national merger) is given 
above in eq. (18). The firm with the higher maximum bid wins the takeover battle. Hence, if 
13    , the national champion is formed and the takeover price that flows between the do-
mestic shareholders is equal to 3    . Similarly, if  31    , firm 3 wins the auction and the 
foreign takeover is implemented. The actual takeover price in this case is  1m i n max[ , ]     , 
since firm 3 might have to pay more than  1    if that price is not sufficient to pass the govern-
ment stage (if  1m i n 3     ). 
                                                 
14 The specific 50-50 division rule would result if the two firms negotiate about the profit sharing rule of the 
national champion in a Nash-bargaining, where the threat point is the pre-merger profit. I.e. the particular divi-
sion rule in assumption 2 appears to be quite natural taking into account that the two firms are ex-ante identical.   16
4.3. Equilibrium ownership structure for given bias B 
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium ownership structure for different strengths of the govern-
ment bias. We choose numerical values for a, b  and c, and we depict  1   ,  3    and  min   over 
the feasible range of g  for different values of . In appendix D we show analytically that the 
results that we discuss for this particular example hold more generally. 
In panel (a) we assume a strong bias so that  min   runs above  3    over the whole range of 
trade openness g . The foreign takeover can never be implemented in this constellation, be-
cause it is ruled out a priori by the biased domestic government. Hence, the national champion 
will always be implemented. As the domestic firm is the only serious bidder in this constella-
tion, assumption 2 applies and the price for the target will be equal to   12 2
nat 
   . That price 
is indicated by the grey dotted line, which is considerably lower than firm 1’s maximum will-
ingness to pay if the foreign takeover were a real threat (  1 12 2
nat 
    ). 
Panel (b) illustrates the opposite case where the government is completely unbiased (B=0). 
The government constraint is never binding as  min   always runs below  3   . All three curves 
are downward sloping in g . The takeover is more profitable for the foreign firm the lower the 
initial trade openness g  is, because a larger chunk of trade costs could be avoided through the 
acquisition. Due to this “tariff-jumping motive” firm 3 is, thus, willing to place a higher 
maximum bid  3    the lower g  is. At the same time the domestic firm 1 has a stronger incen-
tive to prevent the foreign takeover. The reason is that the negative externality is more severe 
the better firm 1 is initially sheltered through the trade cost barrier. Hence, firm 1 is willing to 
place a higher bid  1    the lower g  is in order to prevent the foreign takeover. Finally, the 
minimum price required by the government ( min  ) runs below, but converges to  1    as g  in-
creases, until the two curves collapse at  1 g  . The reason is that the government trades off 
the consumer gain of the foreign takeover ( 0 CS  ) against the domestic profit loss 
( 0   ). At  1 g   the two merger types are equivalent from a consumer perspective 
( 0 CS  ) since there are no trade costs to be avoided, but firm 1 would still suffer a profit 
loss due to the merger synergies. This explains why  1    and  min   must coincide at  1 g  . The 
consumer gain moderates the profit loss for  1 g  , hence  min   is flatter in  g  than  1   . 
Figure 1(b) suggests that the foreign takeover emerges at low levels of trade costs. To the 
right of point Z  the foreign firm outbids the domestic competitor, and the foreign takeover 
will be implemented at the price  1    . To grasp the intuition for this result, consider the 
case with perfect trade openness ( 1 g  ). Firm 3 will outbid firm 1, because it has an initial   17
productivity advantage over the domestic rival ( 1 c  ) which effectively translates into a 
higher bidding power of the foreign firm. The government requires that the domestic profit 
loss  0 
     is compensated with a price  min   = 1   . Firm 3 is willing to pay this 
price while still realizing a strictly positive takeover rent ( 31 0     at  1 g  ). Moving to the 
left on the g axis, both maximum bids  1    and  3    increase but  1    rises steeper than  3   . In 
other words, the tariff-jumping motive for firm 3 is less important at the margin than the anti-
competitive motive for firm 1 that tries to prevent becoming the outsider of the MNE sce-
nario. For high enough levels of g  the domestic firm still loses the takeover battle, because 
the higher bidding power of the foreign firm dominates. Yet, the foreign firm’s initial advan-
tage due to  1 c   is exhausted if g  is low enough (to the left of point Z ), because lower lev-
els of g  raise effective marginal costs for the foreign firm and lower its bidding power.  
In appendix D.1 and D.2 we provide further analytical details. We compute the trade cost 
level  g   where the curves  1    and 3    cross, and we discuss the comparative statics. Further-
more, we show that the foreign firm can never win the auction if it has no productivity advan-
tage (if  1 c  ). Similarly, the MNE would always result if c is low enough, because the do-
mestic firm can then never compete with the bidding power of the foreign rival. To sum up: 
Result 1: Suppose the government is unbiased (B=0). If the difference in unit costs be-
tween firms 1 and 3 is not too large, the foreign takeover emerges at low levels of trade 
costs and the national champion emerges at high levels of trade costs. If c=1 the national 
merger is implemented over the whole range of trade costs. If c is sufficiently low, the 
foreign takeover occurs over the entire feasible range of trade costs. 
 
Qualitatively, result 1 implies that “globalization” (g ) triggers the foreign takeover. This is in 
line with the aforementioned empirical observation that cross-border mergers have become 
more important during the ongoing trend of falling trade barriers. The result is also similar to 
a previous finding by Norbäck and Persson (2004), yet with the important difference that in 
our model the foreign firm can only win the auction at low trade costs if it has some initial 
productivity advantage ( 1 c  ).
15  
                                                 
15 Norbäck and Persson (2004) assume that unit costs of production are the same for the domestic and the foreign 
firm. Furthermore there are no general merger synergies unrelated to trade costs. In their model, focussing on the 
case with high greenfield costs to which our setup corresponds, the foreign bidder wins the auction when trade 
costs are low. In our model this is not true if c=1. The reason for this difference is that the domestic firm has not 
only a “preemptive”, but also an efficiency-seeking motive. If foreign market entry were completely ruled the 
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Furthermore, the result that trade integration clearly triggers cross-border M&A only holds in 
the case with an unbiased government, whereas different results emerge in our model when a 
bias exists. Consider panel (c) of figure 1 where we assume a bias  of medium strength. 
The government constraint  3m i n    is binding for low levels of trade openness (up to point 
Y ), so that firm 1 would buy firm 2 at the low price   12 2
nat 
    (the grey dotted line). In an 
intermediate range of g  between Y  and Y the government constraint is not binding. In the 
lower part of that range (between Y  and Z ) the national champion would still emerge, since 
firm 1 outbids firm 3. Yet, the domestic firm now has to pay the much higher price  3    , 
i.e., the actual takeover price exhibits an upward jump at the point Y , because firm 3 enters 
the scene as a serious bidder. In the range between Z  and Y the foreign corporation would 
win the takeover battle and the MNE is formed. The actual takeover price differs within this 
range. In the range between Z  and V  it is given by  1    , because that price is sufficient to 
get the government support (since  1m i n    ). In the range between V  and Y the foreign firm 
has to pay  min 1      to pass the government stage. Finally, if trade openness is sufficiently 
high (beyond the point Y) the equilibrium ownership structure is again the national cham-
pion. Even though the foreign firm would, in principle, outbid the domestic rival the con-
straint  3m i n     becomes binding and the takeover is blocked. The acquisition price will now 
exhibit a downward jump at Y to the grey dotted line, because from that point onwards the 
domestic firm is again the only potential buyer.  
An increase in the strength of the bias  would shift up the curve  min   and decrease the range 
of  g  in which the foreign takeover can arise, until the MNE is completely ruled out (as in 
panel a). This result is little surprising: the MNE is less likely to emerge as the equilibrium 
ownership structure the stronger the bias against foreign takeovers is. Yet, the more interest-
ing question is how trade integration (g ) affects the equilibrium for a given strength of .  
Figure 1(c) suggests that the national champion arises for low and for high levels of  g . The 
reason for its emergence in these two ranges is entirely different, however. If trade costs are 
high, the national champion is formed because the domestic firm 1 outbids the foreign rival. 
This would happen irrespective of the government involvement.
16 If trade costs are low, the 
occurrence of the national champion is entirely driven by the government bias. With  0   it 
becomes necessary to pay a higher takeover price in order to pass the government stage, and if 
this “tax” on the takeover rent is large enough firm 3 will eventually no longer place a bid.  
                                                 
16 To the left of point Y government involvement affects only the takeover price but not the ownership structure.   20
To understand why the foreign takeover goes through only for intermediate trade costs (be-
tween Z  and Y) one must distinguish two aspects: 
1. In the range between Z  and Y trade openness g  is sufficiently high given the initial 
unit cost advantage ( 1 c  ) so that the foreign firm’s bidding power still prevails over 
the domestic firm’s attempt to prevent the takeover.  
2. At the same time, trade costs savings are sufficiently high in that range, so that the 
foreign takeover implies a consumer gain  CS   that is substantial enough to effec-
tively warrant government approval.  
Result 2 summarizes these insights: 
Result 2: Suppose the government is biased against the foreign takeover (B>0), but this 
bias is not so strong to generally rule out this merger type. In that case the foreign take-
over will arise for intermediate levels of trade costs only. For low and for high levels of 
trade costs the national champion will be implemented.  
Some further details about result 2 are presented in appendix D.3 where we derive the analyti-
cal expressions for the points Y  and Y and discuss the comparative statics. Economically 
this result implies that if trade openness is already high ( 2 ˆ gg  ), further integration rein-
forces the policy option to block the foreign takeover and to promote the national champion. 
 
5.) Optimal choice and endogenous origin of the government bias 
In this last step of the analysis we will discuss how government behaves when it endoge-
nously decides on the level of its bias  in the first stage of the game, and we will show how 
this bias can originate in lobbying efforts by the domestic firm 1.  
 
5.1. Endogenous choice of the bias B 
The strength of the bias  will determine government behaviour during the approval decision 
in the third stage. Government always has the option to set  (and therefore min  ) high 
enough to repel the foreign firm from the auction. This blockade would lead to the formation 
of the national merger, hence the welfare level 
nat 
 . The alternative is to choose  low 
enough to leave the foreign firm in the race for the domestic target. This trade-off for the gov-
ernment is only relevant in those constellations where the foreign firm would, in principle,   21
win the auction for the target (where  31    ). We will therefore restrict our attention to trade 
openness levels  1 gg    (see appendix D).  
Even if government decides not to block the foreign takeover in that range, it would still de-
mand a takeover price  min 3     that “taxes away” all takeover rents from the foreign firm and 
that just leaves it indifferent between buying and not buying the target. Put differently, an 
optimizing government in our model would never be completely unbiased and leave a rent 
	 310     to the foreigner, but it would always squeeze out this rent by setting a suffi-
ciently high level of  and, thus,  min  . In sum, government that strictly maximizes national 








   where 
int int int
13 * CS 
 
     (20) 
We can provide the following result that is proven formally in appendix E.1: 
Result 3: Suppose the foreign bidder has a higher maximum valuation for the target 
than the domestic bidder ( 31    ). A strictly welfare maximizing government would 
never choose a bias level that blocks the foreign takeover, but a level of B such that the 
takeover is allowed and all takeover rents are taxed away from the foreign firm. 
The intuition for this result is clear cut: Even the price  1       suffices to compensate the 
loss in domestic operating profits. In addition there are consumer gains associated with the 
foreign takeover ( 0 CS  ). Hence, the takeover at the higher price  min 3 1      must be 






  ). Result 3 is important as it highlights that a national cham-
pion policy is not likely to be pursued out of strictly welfare-oriented motives.  
In fact, without the blockade firm 1 would earn  1
int 
  and the shareholders of firm 2 receive a 
capital gain   31 1 12
nat int 
 
     . Overall domestic producer surplus without the blockade is, 
thus,  	 31 12
nat 
     . A blockade reduces total domestic producer surplus to only   12
nat 
  , and 
domestic consumer surplus would also be lower by the amount  CS  . An important thing to 
note, however, is that the blockade of the foreign takeover also has important distributional 
consequences by affecting the target’s ability to reap takeover gains (see assumption 2). With 
the blockade the owners of firm 1 would now earn more (  11 12/2
nat nat int 

 
   ), whereas the 
owners of firm 2 now earn less (  23 12/2
nat nat 

     ). This shift in the distribution of domestic 
profits is, per se, irrelevant for utilitarian national welfare. Yet, it is clear that the government   22
blockade of the foreign takeover generates an economic rent equal to   1 12 20
nat int 

    for 
firm 1, so that it has an incentive to lobby for the blockade policy. We now finally turn to our 
political economy framework to analyze this lobbying process. 
 
5.2. The political economy framework and the endogenous origin of the bias 
Our political economy framework is similar to Motta and Ruta (2007), yet with a few impor-
tant differences. Firstly, we add the lobbying game on top of an explicit takeover auction. 
Secondly, trade costs play a crucial role for our analysis, and finally, we assume that only 
firm 1 can influence the government by paying bribes. The other involved parties cannot en-
gage in lobbying, as they do not have access to the domestic politicians (the foreign firm), 
lack a coherent organization to overcome internal free-rider problems (domestic consumers) 
or are stigmatized due to the attempt of selling a national asset abroad (target firm).
17  
We can think of the lobbying process as follows: In the first step firm 1 commits on an 
amount  1   to be paid to the government if it blocks the foreign takeover, which would be im-
plemented otherwise since we focus on cases where  31    . In the second step, the govern-
ment sets these payments  1   into perspective to the welfare gain from allowing the foreign 
takeover ( *0 
  , see appendix E.1). Given its preferences the government will then opti-
mally choose  and the game proceeds as described above. The bribes are paid in the third 
stage where the government effectively declares its decision on the merger case. We assume 
that firm 1’s commitment on  1   is truthful and will not be re-negotiated.   
Government essentially chooses its policy from a binary set    0,1 z  , where  1 z   indicates 
the decision to set  such that the foreign takeover is just implemented, but all rents are taxed 
away from firm 3 ( min 3 1     ). That option is associated with the welfare level  *
int 
  and 
it implies that no bribes from firm 1 will be paid. The other option, indexed with  0 z  , is to 
choose a higher level of , in which case we would have min 3 1     , welfare 
nat 
  and 
bribe payment  1   from firm 1. The government objective function   is assumed to be a 
weighted sum of the welfare gain from allowing the takeover and the bribe payments: 
  	 	 1 *1 1
nat zz       
   
         with  01    ,      0,1 z  . (21) 
The parameter   measures the government’s benevolence, i.e., the weight attached to welfare.  
                                                 
17 In Motta and Ruta (2007) both insiders and outsiders of a potential merger can engage in lobbying. Our results 
remain robust when the target firm 2 is also allowed to engage in lobbying, provided that firm 1 is sufficiently 
more efficient in its lobbying technology.   23
Turning to the first step, the lobbying decision, a government blockade of the foreign takeover 
(policy  0 z  ) would imply the following economic rent for the domestic firm 1 in a situation 
in which the foreign firm would otherwise win the auction, 
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nat nat int c
g b aa c !
 
 
 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 
. (22) 
The maximum contribution that firm 1 is willing to pay for policy  0 z   is, thus, given by 
11 1
nat k !   , where  1 k  can be understood as a net of contribution benefit that will be opti-
mally adjusted by firm 1 if a payment  11
nat !    suffices to induce  0 z  . Using (21) and (22) 
the final policy can be inferred from the following variable  that describes the difference 
in the government objective function with  1 z   and  0 z  , respectively: 
  	 	 	 	 11 10 * 1
nat zz k    !        
      (23) 
When  0    government chooses  1 z  , whereas  0    implies the blockade ( 0 z  ).  
Figure 2 illustrates this decision process. In the left panel (fig. 2a) we depict  over the 
range  1 gg    for different values of   , where we have set  1 0 k   for simplicity. When the 
weight attached to welfare is low government generally promotes the national champion. This 
can be seen in the example with  0.65     (the broken line). Over the whole range of g  we 
have  0    and, thus,  0 z  . Conversely, if    is sufficiently large government would al-
ways choose policy  1 z  , as for example in the case with the thin solid line where  0.77    . 
The example with the thick solid line shows that for the level of  0.71     the foreign takeover 
is only allowed in an intermediate range of trade costs, whereas it is blocked for low and for 
high values of  g . The dotted line ( 0.735    ) depicts a similar case where  1 z   is chosen for 
low and  0 z   for high values of  g  within in the range  1 gg   . The difference between the 
two latter cases is that government still rejects the foreign takeover when it is first requested 
(around  gg   ) in the first, but not in the second one. Both cases have in common that the 
national champion policy  0 z   is pursued once trade costs are low enough. 
The intuition behind these results can be illustrated as in fig. 2b on the right. The thick solid 
line is the proper net welfare gain from allowing the foreign takeover,  *0 
  , which is 
composed of the consumer gain  0 CS   (the downward-sloping broken line) and the pro-
ducer surplus difference  	 33 1 0           (the upward-sloping broken line). This over-
all welfare gain  * 
  is hump-shaped ing , as shown formally in appendix E.1. At low trade 
costs the welfare gain is relatively small because relatively few trade costs could be avoided   24












through the foreign takeover, hence, the implied consumer gain would be small. At high trade 
costs the consumer gain is more substantial, but the gain in producer surplus is now lower. 
The reason is that at gg    we have  31    , i.e., at this point the takeover price just offsets 
the loss in domestic operating profits  0    but there are no additional capital gains result-
ing from the fact that the government adjusts  min   so as to charge  3    from firm 3.  
 
Fig. 2a) Final policy choice 
 
 





parameter values:  3 a  , 1 b  , 0.9 c       0.662 g    
 
In fig.2b we also depict the economic rent  1
nat !  that firm 1 would obtain from a blockade of 
the foreign takeover, see the thin solid line. Two things should be noted. Firstly, the curve 
1
nat !  is strictly decreasing in g . At high trade costs the foreign takeover would be more harm-
ful for firm 1 as it would lose more substantial market shares. Hence, a blockade generates 
higher rents and, thus, firm 1 is willing to pay higher bribes at low levels of  g . Secondly, the 
potential lobbying payment is always higher than the net welfare gain, i.e.,  1 *
nat !  
  gener-
ally holds in the range  1 gg    (see appendix E.2 for the formal proof). The intuition is as 
follows: Firm 1’s willingness to pay for the blockade policy  0 z   is determined by the total 
size of the loss that it would suffer if the foreign takeover is implemented. The welfare gain 
	 31 * CS  
       is, on the other hand, a net calculation that aggregates up the con-
sumer and the capital gain for the owners of the target firm and the profit loss for firm 1. Even 
though the total gains for the winning parties (consumers and firm 2) would outweigh the to-
 
g  
0.65   
0.71     
0.77     
g
1
nat !  
CS   
0.735     
* 

31       25
tal loss for firm 1, only that firm can engage in lobbying, and its total loss turns out to be more 
substantial than the net gain for the domestic country as a whole.
18 
Since  1 *
nat !  
  holds, it is clear that the government would always choose the national 
champion policy  0 z   if it cares equally or more about bribes than about welfare (if 
01 2    ), see eq. (23).  In the range 12 1     it can be shown that  is also hump-
shaped in g  and that there exist at most two levels in the relevant range  1 gg    where 
0    (see appendix E.2). The thin solid and the broken line in fig.2a are cases where cross-
ing point of  with the horizontal axis exists, i.e., where the choice of z  does not change in 
the range of g . The dotted line illustrates a case with one, and the thick solid line depicts a 
case with two crossing points. In both cases the foreign takeover request is blocked and the 
national champion is pushed when trade costs have become sufficiently small.  
Summing up, this section has shown how the government bias against the foreign takeover 
can endogenously originate in a political economy framework. A government that is strongly 
biased and that always rejects the takeover is, more precisely, a government that cares little 
about welfare but a lot about bribes from the would-be outsider firm 1. Conversely, a gov-
ernment that has been called “unbiased” before is one that is mostly welfare oriented and that 
cares sufficiently little about bribes. 
 
6) Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied an oligopoly model with two domestic and one foreign firm, 
where either a national merger is formed or one of the domestic firms is taken over by the 
foreign corporation. The domestic government has to approve any type of M&A. Our main 
focus has been the analysis which merger type arises as the equilibrium ownership structure 
for different levels of trade costs, and for different strengths of the government bias against 
the foreign takeover, which endogenously results from lobbying efforts by the domestic 
would-be outsider firm.  
When the government is unbiased, i.e., if it cares only or almost only about welfare and not 
about bribes, it would not consider blocking the foreign takeover when it is requested by the 
firms. Promoting national champions is not an option for such a government. The national 
                                                 
18 This result depends crucially on the division rule specified in assumption 2. When the blockade generates a 
less favourable profit sharing rule and therefore a lower rent for firm 1, it may not generally be the case that  
1 *
nat !  
  holds for all levels  1 gg   .  Yet, also for such cases it would be true that government chooses 
the national champion formation when    is sufficiently small.    26
merger can still occur if trade costs are high, but due to the fact that the domestic firm outbids 
the foreign rival without the help of the government. When the government is strongly biased, 
meaning that it is predominantly interested in receiving bribes, it would always aim at the 
national champion formation in our model.  
Finally, the most interesting case is probably the one with an intermediate bias resulting from 
a balanced government interest in welfare and lobbying payments. At high trade costs the 
national merger arises as the domestic firm outbids the foreign one. At intermediate levels 
government allows the MNE formation while taxing away all takeover rents from the foreign 
firm. Yet, when trade costs are already sufficiently low, further trade integration reinforces 
the case for promoting the national champion. Below a certain threshold level government 
starts to block the takeover in order to promote the national champion.  
Our model leads to several, potentially testable theoretical hypotheses. Firstly, in countries 
with a welfare-oriented merger policy we should observe that falling trade barriers (globaliza-
tion) trigger more cross-border mergers and acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign corpo-
rations. Of course it is difficult to precisely measure government objectives.  Yet, one possi-
bile way of measuring that follows from our model as well as from Motta and Ruta (2007) is 
to characterize competition policy as welfare-oriented when it is carried out by independent 
authorities whose decisions on merger cases cannot be influenced or overturned by politicians 
who directly strive for re-election. This positive impact of economic integration on cross-
border merger activity should be observable at all current levels of trade costs, as our model 
suggests that there is no threshold level of trade costs where the adopted merger policy 
changes when no government bias exists. Secondly, in countries where elected politicians 
have a sufficiently strong influence on merger policy we should observe that globalization 
also triggers cross-border mergers if the level of trade costs is still high. At a later stage of 
economic integration, however, we should observe an increase in government activity to 
block foreign acquisition attempts in these countries. 
Although there is clearly scope for more thorough empirical research, a casual look at recent 
empirical developments suggests that our model yields quite consistent predictions. On aver-
age there has been a surge of cross-border mergers over the last decades (Hijzen et al. 2008; 
Chapman 2008), which is consistent with our model when the impact of political economy 
mechanisms is not too strong. Yet, this average trend notwithstanding, one can also observe 
that globalization has recently put the idea of promoting national champions high on the pol-
icy agenda at least in some countries, when it comes to foreign takeover attempts of large and 
prominent domestic companies. In these countries (e.g., in France, Spain or Germany) compe-  27
tition authorities are in fact not completely independent, but elected politicians play an impor-
tant role in and, thus, political economy matters for antitrust and merger decisions. Further-
more, all of these countries are well integrated into the world economy, and exposed to fur-
ther economic integration like, for example, EU integration.  
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Appendix A: Proof of lemma 1 
 
part (a): Using (4) and (7) we can compute the following difference terms: 















pre nat ac g s
CS CS
 
  (A2) 
Setting (A1) equal to zero and solving for s we obtain two solutions, one of which always 
falls out of the relevant range 01 s  under the parameter restrictions  2 a  ,  01 c   and 
1 trade gg   where  32 trade gc a   () . In (A3) we report the solution for s
   that falls into the 
relevant range, and where   12 12
nat pre pre 

 
   if 0 ss 
    and   12 12
nat pre pre 

 
   otherwise:  
  	 	 43 2 2
8




     (A3) 
part (b): Setting (A2) equal to zero and solving for s yields a unique solution, labelled  CS s  : 
  	
1
4 6 CS sa c g       (A4) 
where 1 CS ss 
   always holds under the imposed parameter restrictions. The additional 
restriction  6 aa c g   ensures  0 CS s   , and thus 0 1 CS ss 
   . Note that  CS s   is in-
creasing in g , hence lower trade openness requires a stronger threshold synergy effect.      29
Appendix B: Proof of lemma 2 
 
part (a): Let  3 MNE
int int 

    denote the gross profits of the MNE before paying the takeover 
price  . Using (4) and (12) we compute the following gross profit difference for the MNE 




144 16 2 2 3 9 3 2 2
int pre pre
b acs ac g a c g 


         

 (B1) 
It readily follows that this gross profit difference is larger the stronger the synergy effect is 
(the lower s is). At ss 
    (see A3) the first term in the squared parentheses in (B1) becomes 
  	 	 	
2
32 4 2 2 3 2 4 8 0 ag c
g      
which is always larger than the negative second term in squared parentheses in (B1). Hence 
323
int pre pre 


  when ss 
    and, thus, when  CS ss    since 0 1 CS ss 
   . 
 
part (b): The consumer price difference is  	 	 1
12 46 43 int pre pp a s g c
g         . Note 
that  	 0 int pre pp s " "  . At  CS ss    we have  	 	 13 0 int pre pp c g g     , hence 
int pre p p   whenever  CS ss    since ( ) int pre pp  is continuous is s. 
 
part (c): Consider the externality of the foreign takeover on the domestic outsider firm 




144 16 3 9 2
int pre
b acs ac g 

           (B2) 
It is readily verified that   	 11 0
pre int s 

 " "  . Furthermore, at  CS ss   , eq. (B2) becomes 
  	 	 11
1




g gac c g 

           since  2 a   
Hence, if  CS ss   , then  11
int pre 

   since (B2) is also continuous in s.   
 
 
Appendix C: Proof that 	 0 CS      
 
Using (14), (15) and assumption 1, the term  CS     at maximum trade openness  1 g   
becomes  
  	 	  	 1
27 17 6 1 3 0 b CS a a c           ,    
which must be negative since  2 a   and 01 c  . At minimum openness  trade gg   we have 
  	 	  	 	
22 1
54 40 17 9 14 6 2 0 b CS a a c a              
This term must also be negative since all the three terms within the squared parentheses are 
negative with  2 a   and 01 c  . Finally, the term 	 CS     has an extremum at 
34 gc a   since  	 	 	
3 34 / 9 CS g c c g a bg "    "    . At this extremum 
we	
22 [(64 17 ) (9 74) 6( 2)]/54 0 CS a a c a b           , which is also negative. 
Hence,  CS     must be negative over the whole range of g .    
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Appendix D: Equilibrium ownership structure 
In this appendix we show that the qualitative results of figure 1 hold more generally. For this 
proof we use the analytical expressions for the maximum bids of firms 1 and 3, and the mini-
mum required price from the government. These are given by (see eqs. (17), (18) and (19)): 




81 58 2 3 5 c
g b aa c         
    (D1) 




81 561 26 4 0 b ac ac g         
  (D2)   
    	 	 	  	
22 22 36 1
162 7 4 10 16 7 3 4 4 6 10 min
cc
gg b aaa c a c B             
 (D3) 
 
D.1. Minimum and maximum trade costs: Evaluating the terms (D1)-(D3) at  1 g   we obtain 
   	 	  	 1
1
27 11 7 6 1 3 b ga a c      
    (D4)   
  	 	  	 3
1
27 11 7 1 2 5 b ga a c       
    (D5) 
  	 	  	 1
27 11 7 6 1 3 min b ga a c B         (D6) 
(D4) and (D6) show that  1    and   min   coincide at  1 g   if  0  . Note that  31     if  1 c   
and 1 g  . At minimum trade openness  32 trade gc a   ()  the terms (D1) and (D2) become 
  	 	  	 1
1
81 831 1 431 trade b gg a c a c       ,    	 	 3
1
81 561 trade b gg a c         (D5) 
Comparing these terms we find that  	 	 13 trade trade gg gg      if cc    and, vice versa, 
	 	 13 trade trade gg gg      if  cc   , where the threshold level c  is given by 
  	 	
1
15 87 3 1 1 1 ca a      with  01 c    due to  24 a  (D6)   
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bg ga   ""     
  (D7) 
In words, with an unbiased government ( 0  ) the foreign firm wins the auction at zero trade 
costs provided it has some productivity advantage ( 1 c  ). At maximum trade costs the do-
mestic firm wins the auction, provided the productivity advantage of the foreign firm is not 
too strong (provided cc   ). With a strong productivity advantage cc    the foreign firm 
would win the auction over the whole range of g . Without productivity advantage firm 3 
never wins the auction. The maximum bids of both firms are higher the higher trade costs are. 
D.2. Crossing point Z: We now provide the analytical expression for the point in fig.1b where 
1    and  3    cross. Setting (D1) equal to (D2) and solving for g  we find that there is at most 





16 238 30 8 7 225 14
c
gg
aa a c a c
   
     
   (D8) 
With 24 a  the solution g   falls into the relevant range  [ ,1] trade gg #  if  1 cc    and it falls 
out of that range if 0 cc  . With cc    it follows that  13     if  trade gg g   , whereas 
1 trade gg g    implies  13    . Provided  1 trade gg    it can also be shown that  0 gc ""    
and  0 ga ""   . In words, the range of  g  in which the foreign firm outbids the domestic firm 
is larger (i.e., g   is smaller) the stronger the initial productivity advantage of the foreign firm 
is (the lower c is) and the larger the market size is (the larger a is).  
 
 
D.3. Government involvement: Firstly, using (D1) and (D3) it can be shown that 
	 	
3
1m i n 34 9 0 gg c c g a g   ""  " "      
 , i.e., the curve  min   is decreasing in g  and 
it is always flatter than  1   until the two curves collapse at  1 g   (see above). Secondly, using 


















where  	  	
2 25 2 734 759 33 33 20 404 1782 aa c c c b B $       . Assuming a value of B  
that is low enough to warrant a real root ( 0 $ ) we have  12 ˆˆ gg  . 
 
D.3.1. No bias: When  0 B   we find that  2 ˆ 1 g   and  1 ˆ gg    must be true. I.e., one solution 
always falls out of the relevant range  1 trade gg  . The other solution may fall into that range, 
but this crossing point is then always to the left of g   as given in (D8), i.e.,  31     would 
hold. Hence, the government constraint can never become effectively binding with  0 B  .  
 
 
D.3.2. Medium bias: With  0   such that  0 $ , eventually both crossing points fall into the 
relevant range:  12 ˆˆ1 trade gg g  . Since  1 ˆ 0 gg ""   and  2 ˆ 0 gg ""   these crossing points 
move closer together as  increases. There are two possible cases:  12 ˆˆ 1 trade gg g g     
and  12 ˆˆ1 trade gg g g     . The former case corresponds to fig.1c where the foreign takeover 
is approved when firm 3 first wins the auction (at gg   ). In the latter case, which is not illus-
trated graphically, government would still reject the takeover at gg    and only approve it 
when trade costs have fallen below  1 ˆ g . However, also in this case there is a lower threshold 
level  2 ˆ 1 g   below which the government again blocks the foreign takeover. The case 
12 ˆˆ 1 trade gg gg      can never occur as it is inconsistent with our parameter restrictions. 
 
 
D.3.3. Strong bias: As  increases even further, we eventually have  0 $  and no crossing 
point of  3    and  min   exists but  3   < min   generally holds. This case corresponds to fig. 1a and 
occurs whenever  	  	
2 [25 2 734 759 33 33 20 404] 1782 0 aa c c c b        . 
 
   32
Appendix E: Endogenous government bias 
 




nat CS  
  
 
       can be expressed analytically as follows: 
  	 	 	 	
2 1
54 *3 6 4 6 3 3 2 0 1 0 5 6 3 3 3 6 0 cc
gg b ac c c a c  
           
 (E1) 
This term must be positive under the restrictions 24 a ,  1 cc    and   1 gg   , where g   
is given in (D8) and c  is given in (D6). Recall that cc    ensures that  1 trade gg g   . Un-
der the same parameter restrictions it can be shown that  1
27
5 * (18 23 ) 0 c
g ac "
 "     , and 
	 	 	 2
2 1
27 * [33 1 28 10 5 23 ] 0
g cc g g g a g "
 "         . That is, the welfare gain  * 
  
is increasing market size a and in the strength of the productivity advantage of firm 3.  
Furthermore it follows from (E1) that  	 3 27 *3 3 5 2 8 c
g gc g a "
 "      . Hence, 
*0 g "
 "   if g  is small and  *0 g "
 "   if g  is large. The term reaches a maximum at 
	 33 5 28 gc a   , which is always larger than g  . Hence the welfare gain  * 
  is hump-
shaped in g  in the range  1 gg   . 
E.2. Government decision with lobbying: Using (E1) and (22) with  1 0 k   the term  in 
(23) can be rewritten as: 
   	 	  	 	 	 	
11
31 1 3 1 22 12 12 11
nat int int nat CS CS     
 
   
   
                   
Clearly,  0    if  1     and  0    if  0    . At  1
2     this term becomes  
  	
1
2     	 	
22 2 1
324 148 17 6 19 20 36 9 13 12 122 0 b aac a gc g            (E2) 
With  24 a , 1 gg    and  1 cc    the term (E2) is unambiguously negative, which im-
plies that  1 *
nat !  
  holds over the whole range of g . In other words,  0    requires a 
preference parameter    that is sufficiently larger than 12. 
Furthermore, one can prove that  is hump-shaped in g . Differentiating  we obtain 
  	  	 	 3 30 3 10 2 5 8 c
g gc c g a a     " "        . (E3) 
From (E3) it follows that  0 g " "   at  	  	 	 30 3 10 2 5 8 1 gg c c a a         and it 
can be checked that 
22 0 g " "   at gg   , hence  achieves a global maximum at 
1 g . At this maximum we find that sup( ) 0    if    is sufficiently large and sup( ) 0    
otherwise (the latter case corresponds to the broken line in fig.2a). Provided sup( ) 0    
there must be two values of  g  such that  0   . There are three possible cases: i) both val-
ues fall into the relevant range  1 gg    in which case  0    holds in the range in between 
those two values, see the thick solid line in fig.2a as an example; ii) both fall out of that range 
in which case  0    for all feasible values of g , see the thin solid line in fig. 2a; and iii) 
one of the solutions falls into the relevant range and the other falls out of it, as for example in 
the case of the dotted line in fig.2a.  
 